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Aid-in-dying is a complex issue that incites heated global
debate. This issue will become more substantial throughout the
1
next fifty years as the elderly population increases because the
2
elderly are more likely to face decisions regarding end-of-life care.
Despite polarized views on this subject, four countries have enacted
laws that provide specific regulatory systems that permit a person to
3
seek aid-in-dying from a physician. An additional country permits
aid-in-dying, not by statute, but by providing exemptions to
4
prosecution in its penal code. These cases all provide examples of
how changes in social acceptance and medical technology affect
the way the law treats the concept of human dignity at the end of
life. To learn from these examples, we must study them and
analyze which regulatory structures work best and why.
Part I of this article introduces the reader to the various terms
5
used in discussions regarding this topic. Part II gives the historical
background of euthanasia practices around the world and the
movements that have sought to legalize different forms of
6
euthanasia. Part III examines the five countries that have legalized

1. For instance, the population of the United States age sixty-five and older
is projected to double by 2050 (from 39 million in 2009 to 89 million). Senior
Citizen Population on Brink of Explosion in World and in United States: Census Bureau,
SENIORJOURNAL.COM
(June
24,
2009),
http://seniorjournal.com/NEWS
/SeniorStats/2009/20090624-SenCitPopulation.htm (citing International Data Base,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 28, 2010), http://www. census.gov/ipc/www/idb/).
Likewise, the world’s eighty-five and older population is projected to increase
more than fivefold from 2009 to 2050 (from 40 million to 219 million). Id.
2. See Kathy G. Miller, Issue Brief for the Health Policy Tracking Service:
Long-Term Care & End-of-Life Issues, 03-29-10.12, 1 (Mar. 29, 2010) (noting that
“the baby boom generation is increasingly dealing with end-of-life care for their
parents and the prospect of their own mortality,” and that “well over half of those
with long-term care needs are elderly.”). There is also an expectation that “most
people today will die at an advanced age following a period of chronic illness.” Id.
at 2.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
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aid-in-dying and the different regulatory systems those countries
have employed in an attempt to provide patients with choices while
7
avoiding abuses. Finally, in Part IV, I provide an assessment of the
changing cultural climate that has contributed to the legalization
of aid-in-dying in certain countries and whether it is preferable to
8
enact laws that explicitly permit certain forms of aid-in-dying. Part
IV also sets forth the author’s perception of the most functional
attributes of each law.
I.

DEFINING THE TERMS: WHAT IS ALL THIS TALK ABOUT
EUTHANASIA, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND AID-INDYING?

To understand the way that assisted-suicide laws function and
how they are formed, it is imperative to distinguish the societal
definitions of euthanasia and assisted suicide from the legal
definitions of these actions. Webster’s Desk Dictionary defines
9
“euthanasia” as a Greek word for “easy death” or “mercy killing.”
“Mercy killing” has a more elaborate definition, which is “the act or
practice of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or
injured persons or animals with as little pain as possible for reasons
10
of mercy.”
The legal definition of “euthanasia” is “[t]he act or practice of
killing or bringing about the death of a person who suffers from an
incurable disease or condition, esp. a painful one, for reasons of
mercy. . . . sometimes regarded by the law as second-degree
11
murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.”
It
seems that the common definition of “euthanasia” is more
sympathetic than the legal definition, especially considering that
the law sometimes permits a charge of murder or manslaughter to
12
accompany the act.
Black’s Law Dictionary also distinguishes
13
For instance, “active
between different forms of euthanasia.
euthanasia” is defined as “euthanasia performed by a facilitator
(usually a physician) who not only provides the means of death but

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DESK DICTIONARY 188 (1995).
Id. at 339.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (9th ed. 1999).
Id.
Id.
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also carries out the final death-causing act.” This was the type of
euthanasia performed by Dr. Kevorkian when he injected some of
15
his patients with lethal drugs.
It is also interesting to note the difference between the
definitions of “nonvoluntary euthanasia” and “voluntary
euthanasia.” “Nonvoluntary euthanasia” is “[e]uthanasia of an
incompetent, and therefore nonconsenting, person,” whereas
“voluntary euthanasia” is defined as euthanasia “performed with
16
the terminally ill person’s consent.”
Here, competence and
consent are what distinguish nonvoluntary from voluntary forms of
euthanasia. As will be discussed in Part III, this difference is
reflected in Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, in which measures
are in place to ensure that a patient is both mentally competent to
elect to request a prescription for lethal medication and that the
choice she is making is voluntary in the sense that the patient is not
17
coerced by others to choose death.
Finally, “passive euthanasia” is defined as “[t]he act of allowing
a terminally ill person to die by either withholding or withdrawing
18
life-sustaining support such as a respirator or feeding tube.” This
type of euthanasia was the center of controversy in Quinlan and
19
Schiavo, in which guardians sought to withdraw treatment.
14. Id.
15. See Kevorkian Case: Judge Agrees to Drop Assisted Suicide Charge, CNN.com
(Dec. 31, 2007), http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/law/12/17/court.archive
.kevorkian3/index.html (reporting that “Youk [Kevorkian’s patient] initially
thought he was going to inject himself with lethal doses of drugs by operating an
apparatus. But unlike his previous cases, Kevorkian administered the fatal ‘death
potion’ to Youk himself.”).
16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 634.
17. See The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.820
(West 2003) (requiring that a consulting physician confirm in writing that “the
patient is capable, is acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision”).
“Capable” is defined as “in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient’s
attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient
has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care
providers, including communication through persons familiar with the patient’s
manner of communicating if those persons are available.” See id. § 127.800.
18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 634.
19. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671–72 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the
respirator from a patient in a persistent vegetative state could be removed
provided that the patient’s guardian, family, attending physicians, and hospital
ethics committee concurred that there was no reasonable possibility of the patient
“ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state .
. .”); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that a guardian’s compliance with a probate court order to remove
a feeding tube was not an abuse and could not be challenged as such).
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So, how do these terms relate to physician-assisted suicide or
aid-in-dying? First, physician-assisted suicide is “aid-in-dying.” For
the purposes of this article, the term “aid-in-dying” is used, when
20
appropriate, as it is currently the most adopted term. Aid-in-dying
is perhaps best defined as a semi-passive form of voluntary
euthanasia. It is the practice of a physician prescribing lethal
medication to a competent person who voluntarily requests the
21
prescription. Voluntary euthanasia is not quite “passive” in terms
of allowing someone to die by withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, but it also cannot be defined as “active” because the
22
physician does not administer the drugs herself. The physician is
active in writing the prescription, but it is up to the patient to fill
23
the prescription and administer the medication. Most of the basic
components of the way in which this process operates are similar
24
throughout different regulatory systems that permit aid-in-dying.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The word “euthanasia” is derived from a Greek term meaning
25
“good death.” It is this link that prompted a historical discussion
of euthanasia to commence during the periods of classical Greek
and Roman antiquity. In both Greece and Rome, physician-assisted
suicide and individual suicides were a common and tolerated
26
practice. This common view of suicide and euthanasia is primarily
attributed to the societal belief at the time that not all human life
27
Some Roman and Greek philosophers
had inherent value.
connected this concept to the ideas of autonomy and individual

20. See Steve Hopcraft, End of Life Language Choices Matter: It’s “Aid in Dying,”
not “Assisted Suicide,” COMPASSION & CHOICES, http://www.compassionandchoices
.org//documents/FactSheet_LanguageMatters.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2010)
(proposing that the “personal end-of-life choice is most accurately described as
‘aid in dying.’”).
21. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800(11); WASH. REV. CODE §
70.245.010(11) (2009).
22. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 575 (7th ed. 1999).
23. See, e.g., § 127.800(11); § 70.245.
24. See infra Part III.
25. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DESK DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 188.
26. IAN DOWBIGGIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA: LIFE, DEATH, GOD, AND
MEDICINE 8 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 2005) [hereinafter CONCISE HISTORY OF
EUTHANASIA]. In fact, many of the revered thinkers of the time, such as Plato,
viewed suicide as a noble and heroic choice if it avoided the agony of a long,
terminal illness. Id.
27. Id.
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28

rights. These ideas would later be reflected in nineteenth and
29
twentieth century advocacy for physician-assisted suicide.
Other ancient societies also believed that euthanasia was not
30
contrary to their morality. Societies from the South Seas to the
31
This is thought to be
Arctic frequently practiced euthanasia.
more out of necessity due to severely limited resources than due to
32
any philosophical ideas about individual rights.
Much of this historical tolerance changed, however, with the
33
rise of Christianity. The Christian religion emerged in the first
century AD, bringing with it different values about death and
34
Christians were taught that suicide was a form of selfdying.
35
murder, condemning it because it was against “God’s law.” Other
organized religions around the world had similar views on suicide
36
and euthanasia, with some exceptions for religious martyrs.
This condemnation of euthanasia carried through the
37
medieval period. It was at this time that the first hospitals were
established, thereby creating a different and more formal role for
38
physicians than existed in ancient Rome and Greece.
Although the status of the physician had changed, the practice
39
Because medieval
of medicine was not advancing quickly.
hospitals were founded as religious institutions, there was a strong
40
Christian influence on medical practices. Another reason that

28. Id. at 9.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id. (noting that “explicit condemnations of suicide are missing from the
New Testament. It was in later centuries that the church fathers inferred from the
Gospels that suicide was against God’s law.”).
The fact that the word “suicide” was coined much later in history (the
seventeenth century) to replace the phrase “self-murder” signifies that
for centuries Christians followed Augustine’s thinking and regarded the
taking of one’s own life as a form of murder, and thus an abhorrent
crime that required no formal condemnation.
Id. at 13. “Suicide” was actually coined in 1642 by Thomas Browne, a physician
and supporter of euthanasia. Id. at 28. This differed from the Christian
description of suicide as “self-killing.” Id.
36. Id. at 14–15.
37. Id. at 17–18.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 18–19.
40. Id. at 18.
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religious influence presided over medieval medicine was that
physicians could not do much medically to alleviate their dying
41
patients’ ailments. The medieval physician would often play the
role of spiritual advisor at the deathbed, having exhausted the
42
limited medical possibilities for curing the patient.
Ideas about euthanasia changed somewhat in the eighteenth
43
century.
The concept of euthanasia was debated more and
44
regained acceptance in writings by contemporary thinkers. The
expansion of the newspaper press also aided in a more widespread
45
discussion and gained sympathy for suicide and euthanasia. The
increasing spread of information through the press made suicides
common knowledge, and, thus, more commonplace and less
46
shocking and taboo in society. Because people were able to read
about the stories behind the suicides, each incident of suicide
47
seemed more or less justifiable. With justifiable reasons behind
suicides, the people committing suicide were more commonly
48
viewed as victims rather than criminals.
This trend continued through the century’s Enlightenment
era, with interest in science peaking and people beginning to
49
question religious theories regarding life and death. As during
the Greek and Roman eras, many scholars of the time saw suicide
50
as a question of individual liberty and personal autonomy. These
ideas had an effect on the law: the result of prominent thinkers
questioning the cruelty and purpose of the laws prohibiting suicide
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. The Christian version of the “good death” was strikingly different
from the ancient Greek and Roman understanding of the term. Id. at 17–18.
The good death would involve the administration of the sacraments and
provide the opportunity for the sick person to atone for any wrongdoings
committed in life. Those in pain, distress, and despair were meant to be
comforted in all physical and moral ways, but suffering was also viewed as
punishment for past sins and a means of emulating the passion of the
Savior himself.
Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 28.
46. Id. at 29.
47. Id.
48. Id. “The effect was less approval of suicide than acceptance of it as a fact
of human existence and, for some, a belief that religious definitions of suicide
were oversimplistic.” Id.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Id. at 31 (citing Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Hume as scholars who
emphasized this belief).
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“was that judges were increasingly softening their decisions
51
regarding the reasons behind suicides.” These judges would often
rule that a person who had committed suicide was not guilty by
52
reason of insanity.
The Victorian era of the nineteenth century proved to be a
step backward for the social acceptance of euthanasia and suicide.
The Christian Evangelical movement, which strictly opposed any
53
form of suicide, was rapidly on the rise in Europe and America.
The preachers associated with this movement taught that strict
moral reformation of society was needed and that “Christ’s coming
54
was at hand.” This era experienced a reversion to the medieval
55
model of a “good death.” Ministers taught that suffering at death
56
This belief coincided with the
was a sign of God’s grace.
Evangelical emphasis on sin, judgment, the torments of hell, and
57
the worship of a “suffering Jesus.”
Medicine in the nineteenth century was still not particularly
58
Although the medical
advanced in terms of curing diseases.
profession was becoming more sophisticated, doctors could not do
much for dying patients except counsel them and administer
59
opiates to ease pain. The theory at the time was that there came a
point when the physician should cease attempts to cure the patient,
but that death should not be hastened because it can be more
60
comfortable with palliative care. At this time, a few doctors were
publicly admitting that they had performed euthanasia on patients
61
when asked. Despite this willingness by some physicians to speak
approvingly of euthanasia, it remained a concept that the medical
51. Id. at 32. Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria was extremely critical of
the laws proscribing suicide, reasoning that “punishing the suicide’s body by
dragging it though the streets or driving a stake through the cadaver’s heart was as
ridiculous as whipping a statue. Similarly, confiscating the property of the
deceased was merely punishing the innocent.” Id. at 33.
52. Id. at 32 (suggesting that “[t]his pattern in legal judgments reflected the
mounting tendency to ascribe voluntary death to natural causes rather than the
influence of Satan.”). This idea reflects the Enlightenment emphasis on science
and skepticism of religious theories.
53. Id. at 39.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 39–40.
57. Id. at 40–41.
58. Id. at 42–43.
59. Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 44–45.
61. Id. at 51.
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62

profession as a whole condemned.
Social views on euthanasia changed drastically when Charles
63
Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859. The scientific
theory of evolution established by Darwin’s work changed the
64
public’s understanding of the human species. Those who were
persuaded by this line of thought viewed human life as being no
65
more valuable than any other natural form of life. All human life
was no longer “sacred” in light of the scientific concepts that
humans evolved from lesser life forms and that the success of the
species was due to natural selection in which only the fittest beings
66
in the species survived to pass on their genetic legacy.
Evidence of natural selection grew into a social concern over
“degeneracy”—the fear that the poor, uneducated, and feeble
members of society (who had substantially higher birthrates than
the wealthy and more educated classes) would eventually take over
67
as the majority class. This theory spawned the idea of eugenics,
68
which developed in the 1860s. Supporters of euthanasia argued
that euthanizing feeble members of society was merely doing what
nature would have done through natural selection, in the absence
69
of social programs for the downtrodden.
Another broad trend sweeping the Western World during the
nineteenth century was secularization, wherein many educated
62. Id. Specifically, the official stance of the medical profession was that
euthanasia “‘could only be regarded as the practice of murder.’” Id. (citation
omitted). There was a tendency to distinguish between active and passive
euthanasia, as the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (later the New England Journal
of Medicine) endorsed the “voluntary refusal to use heroic, extreme methods to
keep dying patients alive simply to prolong their lives.” Id. Yet the institution
found that “[t]here was a world of difference between letting nature take its
course and actually shortening patients’ lives through medical intervention.” Id.
Here, the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal was already entertaining a “right-todie” in terms of a patient’s right to refuse life-prolonging treatment. See id.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 53.
66. Id.
67. Id. This concern was shared by Darwin as well, who “worried about how
modern medicine, hospitals, asylums, and other charitable institutions affected
evolution. Because they essentially protected society’s unfit from the blind
ruthlessness of natural selection, they enabled the weak and improvident to survive
and reproduce their own kind.” Id.
68. Id. at 54 (defining eugenics as “efforts to improve the biological quality of
future generations”).
69. Id. As crass as this may sound, at the time this was seen as a kinder way to
carry out nature’s work. Id. Instead of allowing the more “unfit” human beings to
suffer on the street, that suffering would be cut short through euthanasia. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 12

2010]

AID-IN-DYING

179

people adopted the idea “that individual freedom of thought
70
Secularization caused
trumped obedience to church dogma.”
many people to depart from the traditional Christian view of a
71
“good death” and to perceive death as a medical event instead.
In the early twentieth century, social perceptions of euthanasia
72
in the United States were reflected in case law and legislation. In
1902 and 1908, for instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
73
overturned two murder convictions for assisted suicides.
Nevertheless, by 1973, assisted suicide was outlawed by the Texas
74
legislature. Early attempts to legalize euthanasia included bills
75
introduced in Ohio and Iowa in 1906; both were defeated.
In 1915, Illinois witnessed a famous incident involving passive
76
euthanasia. The doctor in the “Baby Bollinger” case refused to
77
perform a life-saving operation on a deformed baby. The parents
78
had agreed to forego the surgery.
Nevertheless, the state still
attempted, but ultimately failed, to prosecute the doctor for his
79
refusal to intervene under a criminal negligence theory.

70. Id. at 57–58.
71. Id. at 58. “Increasingly, people perceived death to be a medical event that
could be alleviated by ether, chloroform, or morphine. To some, that included
administering overdoses to terminally ill patients.” Id. at 58.
72. Id. at 72.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 73.
77. Id. An interesting fact to note about this case is that the doctor who
refused to operate, Dr. Haiselden, had adopted two girls and raised them with the
help of his mother. Id. A strong source of Dr. Haiselden’s support of euthanasia
for the handicapped at birth was “his bitter hatred of institutionalization,”
including institutions for orphaned children. Id. He even published a
“muckraking exposé” of the deplorable conditions for the mentally handicapped
in an Illinois institution. Id.; see also Baby Dies; Physician Upheld, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Nov. 18, 1915 [hereinafter Baby Dies; Physician Upheld].
78. See Baby Dies; Physician Upheld.
79. See MARTIN S. PERNICK, THE BLACK STORK: EUGENICS AND THE DEATH OF
“DEFECTIVE” BABIES IN AMERICAN MEDICINE AND MOTION PICTURES SINCE 1915, 7–8
(1996). Although the case underwent several official investigations by the hospital
and local authorities, Dr. Haiselden was never sanctioned for refusing to save the
baby’s life. See id. A panel of doctors criticized Dr. Haiselden’s actions but
ultimately found that “he was ‘fully within his rights in refusing to perform any
operation which his conscience will not sanction.’” Id. at 7. Additionally,
although the Illinois Attorney General demanded an indictment, the state’s
attorney refused to file charges, reasoning that “the Bollingers had the right to
withhold their consent and that parental consent would have been required to
operate.” Id. at 7–8.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/12

10

Ebbott: A "Good Death"? Defined by Law: Comparing the Legality of Aid-In-

180

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

The pre-World War I years found American and European
societies experiencing a massive growth of asylums for the mentally
and physically handicapped and an increasing number of patients
80
in them.
By the 1930s, the number of asylums and patients
created even more intense feelings that the dependent
handicapped population was a burden on society, especially when
society was in the middle of the Great Depression and in the
81
In addition, the physicians
aftermath of a devastating war.
treating the mentally ill grew increasingly frustrated because the
82
patients seemed nearly impossible to treat.
This increasing support for euthanasia fueled the founding of
83
the first two pro-euthanasia organizations.
The first was the
Voluntary Euthanasia Legalization Society (VELS), founded in
84
Great Britain in 1935. Three years later, the Euthanasia Society of
85
America (ESA) was established in the United States.
Both
organizations took the official stance of supporting only voluntary
euthanasia, although some of the individual members supported
86
additional involuntary forms of euthanasia.
The VELS introduced a bill in 1936 “that would make it legal
87
for terminally ill adults to request medical aid-in-dying.” As the
88
organization expected, the bill was defeated. In 1939, the ESA
drafted a bill for introduction in the New York legislature, similarly
targeting voluntary euthanasia only for terminally ill adults, but the
89
organization could not find any legislators willing to introduce it.
80. CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA, supra note 26, at 65. Additionally,
Europe and the United States were experiencing diverging views on religion. Id.
at 75. While Europe saw a substantial decrease in organized religion, religion
became more pervasive in the United States with the revival of Evangelism and the
initiation of the Fundamentalist movement. Id. at 75–76. This is believed to have
resulted mostly from the Europeans’ proximity to the horrors on the World War I
front, which caused many Europeans to question whether there was a God. Id. at
77. This contributed to changing views on euthanasia and the value of human life
as “[i]t was difficult for clerics to maintain that life was sacred when it was spent so
cheaply by politicians and generals.” Id. at 77.
81. Id. at 79–80.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 82.
86. Id. at 81, 84.
87. Id. at 81. This concept is not unlike the laws that exist today. See, e.g.,
infra Part III (legislation in Oregon, Washington, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg has made it legal for terminally ill adults to request aid-in-dying).
88. CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA, supra note 26, at 81.
89. Id. at 84.
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Other attempts were made to introduce similar legislation in 1937
90
in Nebraska and Ohio, but these failed as well.
Nevertheless, public opinion polls taken in the United States
from 1937 and 1939 showed that forty-five percent of those polled
supported euthanasia for deformed or mentally handicapped
infants, while thirty-seven percent of the public supported
91
voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill adults.
Although
unsuccessful in the legislature, the euthanasia movement in the
1930s received a considerable amount of public support and
92
publicity. In 1939, Time magazine reported that mercy killings
93
were occurring at a rate of one per week. Additionally, courts
showed a willingness to acquit people convicted of murder in
94
especially compelling mercy-killing cases.
The public support enjoyed by euthanasia advocates in the
1930s soon faded as the Nazi atrocities involving eugenics were
95
exposed during World War II. This was especially true in the
United States, where the American Medical Association maintained
96
its conservative position in matters of bioethics. Also, the Catholic
Church was on the rise, becoming omnipresent in politics and
97
popular culture. A public opinion poll taken in 1950 showed a
ten percent drop in support for physician-assisted suicide as
98
compared to a poll taken in 1939.
The focus of debate shifted away from euthanasia and toward a
“right to die” in the 1960s when “[i]mportant technological
innovations in the medical treatment of the terminally ill were
beginning to spark a mounting debate over the issue of
99
unnecessary and unwanted treatment.” Included in this debate
were the “doctrine of double effect” and the concept of “situational
100
ethics.” One advocate found links between the ability to control
90. Id. at 85.
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 87.
95. Id. at 91.
96. See id. at 99.
97. Id. at 100.
98. Id. at 98.
99. Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 105 (explaining under the “double effect” doctrine there is no
commission of sin if an earlier death resulted from a doctor administering
narcotics to alleviate patient pain, so long as the patient consented to the use of
drugs; and under “situational ethics” there were no absolute moral standards to
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death and the struggle over women’s reproductive rights.
Yet
there was still a powerful voice coming from the oppositional
mainstays of the Catholic Church and the American Medical
102
Association.
Euthanasia advocacy groups, now supporting a “right to die,”
103
gained optimism as the twentieth century decades rolled past.
104
The
Concern over population control grew in the 1960s.
realization that the world’s resources could not sustain an infinite
number of people once more changed the way that people thought
105
about the value of life.
High birthrates in many countries,
coupled with the increased ability of medicine to keep people alive
for longer, meant that “the traditional idea that each individual life
was sacred appeared outdated when the populations of countries
106
such as India and China were nudging close to the billion mark.”
At the same time, the Catholic Church permitted
“withhold[ing] unwanted, unnecessary treatment as long as it was
107
clearly the patient’s wish.”
This hint of acceptance now became
the focus of the euthanasia movement, which saw the right to
withhold treatment as an important stepping-stone toward winning
108
a right to medical assistance in dying. The rights of patients and
medical costs became popular topics of discussion within the
109
medical profession,
and society as a whole became more
110
comfortable talking about death and the dying process.
Important legal battles ensued over the next few decades following
111
the 1960s.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that
Karen Ann Quinlan had a right to privacy that encompassed the
112
right to terminate medical treatment. Ms. Quinlan had been in a
coma for three months when her parents asked the hospital to

guide medical treatment and what was right or wrong depended upon the
circumstances facing each patient).
101. Id. at 106.
102. See id. at 107.
103. Id. at 111.
104. See id. at 115.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 116.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 120.
110. Id. at 121.
111. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A Tough Pill To Swallow, 20
PEPP. L. REV. 689, 727–28 (1993); infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
112. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976).
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disconnect her from the respirator that was keeping her alive.
The hospital refused, and the respirator continued to support
114
her.
Finally, the court ruled that she had a legal “right to die,”
115
and ordered the hospital to comply with her parents’ request.
Quinlan was highly publicized, and it “helped to crystallize the
evolving sentiment in favor of a personal right to control the time,
116
place, and manner of one’s death.”
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, organizations supporting
assisted suicide grew stronger. In 1980, the Hemlock Society was
117
founded in the United States.
This organization departed from
the focus of most other euthanasia groups at the time by
advocating for the legalization of mercy killing in addition to
118
voluntary euthanasia.
The AIDS epidemic was also influential in the increased push
to support euthanasia. AIDS patients found themselves suffering
“prolonged pain, disfigurement, and loss of dignity,” which led
119
many to seek euthanasia as an alternative.
Highly advanced
medical technology permitted people with incurable diseases to
120
stay alive for longer periods of time.
This is still the case today,
and because terminal illnesses like AIDS are treatable but not
curable, advanced medicine has the potential to prolong patients’
121
suffering.
113. CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA, supra note 26, at 122.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671 (holding that if responsible
attending physicians conclude there is no possibility of Ms. Quinlan emerging
from the comatose state, the life support should be discontinued upon a
consultation with the hospital’s Ethics Committee).
116. CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA, supra note 26, at 122 (noting that,
regardless of Quinlan, public opinion in support of euthanasia had increased since
the 1950s). In support of this proposition, the author cites Gallup polls that asked
“[whether] voluntary euthanasia should be permitted by law if the patient is
incurably ill.” Id. The poll results showed that fifty-three percent answered yes in
1973, sixty percent in 1977, sixty-five percent in 1985, and sixty-nine percent in
1990. Id. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that survey findings do not
necessarily demonstrate a tendency to support legalization. Id. at 122–23.
117. Id. at 129.
118. Id. This group disbanded in part due to highly controversial actions
taken by some of the members. Id. at 130. These actions involved members of the
organization assisting suicides of people whose “full ability to consent was
questionable.” Id.
119. Id. at 134.
120. See MILLER, LONG-TERM CARE, END-OF-LIFE ISSUES, supra note 2, at 2.
121. See id. (citing a report from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, which found that “the medical advances of the past century have
shifted the leading cause of death from infectious disease to chronic disease,
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Whether socially accepted or taboo, suicide and euthanasia
122
have always been practiced. It is not the existence of the act that
has changed throughout history, but the social, moral, and legal
123
acceptability of it. History reveals a picture of a societal tug-of-war
124
This unsteady environment has
over the issue of euthanasia.
affected the ability of many countries to pass legislation on the
125
subject.
Since the late nineteenth century, there has been an
increasing societal interpretation of euthanasia as “actual mercy
killing or medically assisted suicide,” as opposed to involuntary
126
forms of euthanasia. This shifting social understanding may have
contributed to the laws on aid-in-dying that have recently been
enacted.
III. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE LEGALIZED ASSISTED SUICIDE
A.

The Netherlands
1.

Legislative Background

Although euthanasia in the Netherlands had been illegal since
the late nineteenth century, the act of euthanasia continued to be
127
openly practiced throughout the country.
Doctors were
sometimes charged with assisting suicides, but were not often
128
found guilty.
Those who were convicted typically received light
penalties compared to the twelve-year statutory maximum
resulting in longer life spans.”).
122. See CONCISE HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA, supra note 26, at 8–9 (discussing
euthanasia and suicide as common practices in ancient Greece and early imperial
Rome).
123. See id. at 5. “[T]he history of euthanasia has been largely conditioned by
evolving opinions about what constitutes a good death, which in turn has
depended on shifting value systems governing such things as sin, suffering,
resignation, judgment, penance, and redemption.” Id.
124. See id. at 153 (concluding that “the global struggle over how society
defines a right to die is far from over.”).
125. See id. at 145–52 (comparing and contrasting the difficulties of passing
euthanasia bills in Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and the
Netherlands).
126. Id. at 49.
127. See id. at 128. “Almost overnight, the Dutch adopted the idea that as long
as people are going to use drugs, visit bordellos, and conceive babies out of
wedlock, the government should regulate these behaviors rather than condemn
them. The same thinking applied to euthanasia.” Id.; see also JENNIFER M. SCHERER
& RITA J. SIMON, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 54 (1999)
(stating that euthanasia and assisted suicide are regularly practiced).
128. See SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 55.
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129

sentence. In 1981, guidelines for non-criminal aid-in-dying were
130
Three years later,
established by the Rotterdam criminal court.
the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) proposed similar
131
guidelines.
These were termed the “rules of carefulness,” by
132
which the practice of euthanasia could be justified.
In 1991, the attorney general of the Dutch Supreme Court
released a study on the practice of euthanasia and other end-of-life
medical decisions in the Netherlands, commonly known as the
133
“Remmelink Report.” By 1993, “the Dutch Parliament agreed to
endorse euthanasia under certain conditions” but refused to grant
134
Due to the
physicians immunity from prosecution in all cases.
high rate of unreported cases of euthanasia (presumably out of fear
of prosecution), the KNMG and Ministry of Justice joined in
creating a notification procedure for deaths resulting from

129. Id. at 56; see also Sjef Gevers, Euthanasia: Law and Practice in The
Netherlands, 2 BRIT. MED. BULL. 326, 327 (1996), available at
http://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/52/2/326.pdf (citing Article 293 of
the Dutch Penal Code).
130. See SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 56. The guidelines stated that
the patient must be suffering from unbearable pain; the patient must be
conscious; the desire to die must be enduring; the decision to die must
be given freely and voluntarily; the patient must have been given
alternatives to euthanasia and time to consider the alternatives; no
reasonable solution to the problem must exist; the death of the patient
cannot inflict unnecessary suffering on others; more than one person
must be involved in the euthanasia decision; the patient must have a
clear understanding of his condition; and extreme care must be taken in
actually making the final euthanasia decision.
Id. (citation omitted) (noting that the guidelines do not require the patient to be
terminally ill or that the suffering be physical).
131. See id. at 57. These rules suggested that
euthanasia not be prosecuted . . . (1) if the mentally competent patient
made freely and knowingly and repeatedly documented requests for
euthanasia, (2) if the patient experienced untreatable, unrelievable pain
(the illness did not have to be terminal), and (3) if the physician in
charge of the patient consulted at least one other physician, who agreed
that euthanasia was the only solution.
Id. “[T]he physician was [also] not obligated to perform euthanasia but could
instead refer the patient to another physician.” Id. KNMG stands for Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot beverdering der Geneeskunst. Julia Belian,
Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 255, 257 (1996)
(stating that Dutch courts used the insights and guidelines of the KNMG to punish
doctors who committed euthanasia).
132. See SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 57.
133. Id. at 57–58.
134. See id. at 60 (stating that “no legal right to euthanasia existed, and
physicians could be prosecuted if the guidelines were not followed.”).
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135

euthanasia. This procedure required that physicians “inform the
medical examiner (or coroner) of the circumstances of the death
instead of declaring a natural death,” which was incorporated into
136
the Burial Act of 1994.
However, this position was “ambiguous”
as
euthanasia [would] remain a crime even if it [was] carried
out by a doctor who complie[d] with all the
restrictions . . . . But at the same time, the modification of
the Burial Act implie[d] that a doctor [would] not be
prosecuted if he or she carefully commit[ted] that
137
crime.
A series of court rulings at the time resulted in a situation
where euthanasia and assisted suicide remained offenses subject to
138
The 1984 guidelines set by the KNMG
the defense of necessity.
139
These guidelines constituted the
were revised in 1995.
140
foundation for the 2002 law legalizing assisted suicide.

135. See id. at 57.
136. Id.
137. Gevers, supra note 129, at 332.
138. See NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA
104 (Robert P. George ed., 2006) (citing Schoonheim, in which the Dutch Supreme
Court announced this defense to the legal ban on assisted suicide. Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 1985, no. 106, translated in JOHN GRIFFITHS, ALEX BOOD & HELEEN
WEYERS, EUTHANASIA & LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 322–28 (Amsterdam U. Press,
1998)). “The court defended the doctor’s conduct . . . because of the perceived
‘necessity’ resulting from a conflict of duties or force majeure (overmacht)
confronting the doctor, explaining that the killing was justified by the doctor’s
judgment about the quality of his patient’s life . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original).
139. See SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 60. The changes in the
guidelines were
that assisted suicide is preferable to euthanasia . . . [,] consulting
physicians who provide their opinions should not be connected to either
the patient or the physician . . .[, and] if the attending physician is
opposed to euthanasia and assisted suicide, he or she has the obligation
to locate another physician who is willing to perform euthanasia or
assisted suicide.
Id.
140. See Assisted Suicide in the World, CBC NEWS, (2007) http://www.cbc.ca/fifth
/givedeathahand/world.html [hereinafter Assisted Suicide in the World].
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The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act

On April 1, 2002, the Termination of Life on Request and
141
Assisted Suicide Act became effective in the Netherlands.
The
Act’s definition of assisted suicide is: “intentionally assisting in a
suicide of another person or procuring for that other person the
142
means [to commit suicide] . . . .” Under the Act, assisted suicide
is permitted when a physician meets the requirements of “due
143
care.” The physician must:
1. hold[] the conviction that the request by the patient was
voluntary and well-considered,
2. hold[] the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting
and unbearable,
3. . . . inform[] the patient about the situation he [is] in and
about his prospects,
4. . . . and the patient [held] the conviction that there was no
other reasonable solution for the situation he was in,
5. . . .consult[] at least one other, independent physician who
has seen the patient and has given his written opinion on
the requirements of due care, referred to in parts 1–4, and,
6. ha[ve] terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due
144
care.
These standards do not require a patient to be terminally ill or
145
suffer any physical pain.
Also absent are a “specified waiting
period after the request for euthanasia before it may be
performed” and any “requirement that the patient place his or her
146
wishes in writing.”
Assisted suicide may be requested by minors
147
They may request assisted suicide on
aged sixteen to eighteen.
their own as long as they are “deemed to have a reasonable
148
understanding of [their] interests.”
A parent or guardian must

141. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act, (Neth.) [hereinafter Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
Act], available at http://www.nvve.nl/assets/nvve/english/EuthanasiaLaw.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2010) https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2001-194.html
(Dutch version of Act).
142. Id.
143. Id
144. GORSUCH, supra note 138, at 106.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (adding that minors aged twelve to sixteen may also request assisted
suicide, but must have parental consent).
148. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 141.
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be involved in the decision-making process, but the minor may
149
make his own decision independent of his parents’ wishes.
The watchdog presiding over physicians assisting patients with
suicides consists of five “Regional Evaluation Commissions,” which
assess whether a case of euthanasia or assisted suicide complies with
150
the statute’s criteria regarding due care.
A case only comes
before the public prosecutor if the commission determines that the
physician did not exercise due care, although the public prosecutor
has the authority to run an independent investigation, if
151
necessary. These commissions also publish annual reports, which
152
are available to the public.
B.

Belgium
1.

The Belgian Act on Euthanasia
153

The Belgian Act on Euthanasia was also adopted in 2002.
The Act defines euthanasia as “intentionally terminating life by
someone other than the person concerned, at the latter’s
154
request.” This law is similar to the one in the Netherlands. The
Belgian law permits physicians to assist in the suicide of a patient
155
whose suffering can be physical or mental. After committing an
act of euthanasia, a physician must submit a report to the Federal
156
Control and Evaluation Commission.
This commission will
149. GORSUCH, supra note 138, at 106 (citing Termination of Life on Request
and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 141).
150. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Control Act Takes Effect on 1 April 2002,
THE DUTCH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Mar. 26, 2002), http://english.justitie.nl
/currenttopics/pressreleases/archives2002/-euthanasia-and-assisted-suicidecontrol-act-takes-effect-on--april-.aspx.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28th, 2002, 9 ETHICAL PERSP. 182
(Dale Kidd, trans., 2002), available at http://www.kuleuven.be/cbmer/viewpic
.php?LAN=E&TABLE=DOCS&ID=23 [hereinafter Belgian Act]; see also Belgium
Legalizes Euthanasia, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/europe/1992018.stm (outlining the number of votes for and against the act in
the legislature).
154. Belgian Act, supra note 153, at 182.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 185. The registration form that the doctor is required to complete
must be submitted to the commission within four working days of the patient’s
death. Id. The commission consists of sixteen members, eight of which are
medical doctors with at least four of those persons being professors at a Belgian
university. Id. Four members are either law professors at a Belgian university or
practicing attorneys. Id. The final four members are selected from groups that

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 12

2010]

AID-IN-DYING

189

review the circumstances of the physician’s acts in assisting with the
157
patient’s suicide. If the commission is satisfied that the physician
complied with the statutory guidelines, then no further action will
158
be taken. If, however, the commission finds that the statute was
breached by the physician, the case will be referred to the public
prosecutor in the jurisdiction in which the euthanasia was
159
performed.
2.

Comparison with the Netherlands

This law differs slightly from the Netherlands Act in several
ways. First, for euthanasia to be legal, the patient must be an adult
160
or an emancipated minor.
Other minors are not allowed to
choose physician-assisted suicide, even if they have the consent of
161
The requirements of competency and
their parents.
voluntariness are still in place, but Belgium requires that the
162
patient’s request be repeated to ensure that it is voluntary.
In
addition, the patient’s condition must be “medically futile”; that is,
163
it cannot be alleviated by any existing medical treatments.
Similar to the Netherlands Act, the physician must hold a personal
belief that there is no reasonable alternative for the patient to
exercise, and the physician must ensure that the patient is fully
164
informed of her condition and the options available.
Yet, in
contrast with the Netherlands, the Belgian Act requires the
physician to have several conversations with the patient that are
165
spread out over a reasonable period of time.

handle issues regarding terminally ill patients. Id. Like the Netherlands
commission, the Belgian commission is charged with distributing reports for the
benefit of the legislature. Id. at 186. These reports are to be submitted every two
years (whereas they are submitted on an annual basis in the Netherlands). Id.
157. Id. at 186. The commission particularly evaluates the second part of the
registration form, which includes, among other information, details about the
patient’s condition, the voluntariness of the requested euthanasia, and the persons
with whom the physician consulted with regarding the patient’s request. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 182.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 186.
163. Id. at 182, 184.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 182.
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Additional requirements are imposed when the physician
166
believes that the patient is not expected to die in the near future.
167
In that case, a second physician must be consulted.
That
physician must be a psychiatrist or specialist in the field of the
168
There is also a one-month waiting period
patient’s disorder.
169
between the patient’s request and the act of euthanasia.
All
170
patient requests must be in writing.
The Belgian statute also distinguishes cases in which a patient
171
is no longer able to express her will. These circumstances require
an advance directive that instructs the physician to perform
172
euthanasia. Euthanasia is permitted under an advance directive if
the physician can verify that the patient suffers from an incurable
disorder, the patient is no longer conscious, and the condition is
173
irreversible.
Other physicians and hospital staff must be
174
consulted in this circumstance, as well.
3.

Effects of the Belgian Act

Reports indicate that the overall rate of “euthanasia” in
175
Belgium has increased since the law’s enactment
It is thought
that the overall increase is due to much higher numbers of deaths,
176
which result from palliative care measures taken in hospitals.
These include continuous deep sedation and the increased use of
strong painkillers, such as morphine, which can inadvertently
177
hasten death (known as the “doctrine of double effect”).
166. Id. at 183.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 183–84.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Gene Emery, Belgium has Significant Hike in Euthanasia After Law, REUTERS
(Sept.
9,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews
/idUSTRE5886AN20090909. The percentage increased from 1.1 percent in 1998
to 1.9 percent in 2007. Id.
176. See id.
177. See Adam Brimelow, The Alternative to Euthanasia?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 12,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8184108.stm (discussing the use of
continuous deep sedation); Drive to Cut Unnecessary Patient Pain, BBC NEWS (July 7,
2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/821645.stm (discussing the doctrine
of double effect and the use of morphine to alleviate pain in terminal patients);
Dr. Moor: Landmark Verdict, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
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Luxembourg

Luxembourg approved its euthanasia law in 2008, completing
178
the legalization of aid-in-dying among the Benelux countries.
The law is similar to the legislation in Belgium and the
Netherlands, where “euthanasia would be allowed for the
terminally ill and those with incurable diseases or conditions, only
when they asked to die repeatedly and with the consent of two
179
doctors and a panel of experts.”
There have been few reports
discussing the effectiveness of the law. Although the law passed by
180
a fairly narrow margin in Parliament,
the Luxembourg
Parliament had a significant enough majority in favor of the law to
pass a constitutional amendment to override the Grand Duke’s
181
expected veto of the bill. After the Grand Duke’s refusal to sign
the law, Parliament decided to proceed without the consent of the
182
Thus, the legalization of
monarchical ruler of the country.
euthanasia in Luxembourg not only changed the options available
to terminally ill patients, it also initiated a structural change in
Luxembourg’s government as a whole.
D.

The United States

The United States has been gradually progressing toward
granting its citizens a right to die, including the ability to receive
183
aid-in-dying. The United States is different from other countries
/hi/health/background_briefings/euthanasia/331263.stm (story of a physician in
the UK who was acquitted of murder charges for administering a lethal dose of
painkillers to a terminally ill cancer patient, explaining that the doctrine of double
effect arises when “doctors are allowed to administer potentially lethal doses of
painkilling drugs to relieve suffering, provided they do not primarily intend to kill
the patient”).
178. See Julien Ponthus, Luxembourg Parliament Adopts Euthanasia Law, REUTERS;
(Feb.
20,
2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews
/idUSL2011983320080220.
179. Id.
180. Id. (the law passed by a 30-to-26 vote margin).
181. Vanessa Mock, Luxembourg Monarch Muzzled over Euthanasia, INDEP. (Dec. 11,
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/luxembourg-monarchmuzzled-over-euthanasia-1062382.html (noting that while the “hereditary monarch’s
powers are largely nominal . . . , no new legislation can come into force without
royal assent,” and that the amendment limits Luxembourg’s monarchs to
“announcing decisions of parliament.”).
182. Id. (reporting how the “unprecedented crisis” has worried Luxembourg’s
citizens).
183. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–95 (2009) (statute permitting aid-indying); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/12

22

Ebbott: A "Good Death"? Defined by Law: Comparing the Legality of Aid-In-

192

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

in that the individual states, not the country as a whole, assume the
184
right to decide whether or not to legalize aid-in-dying.
1.

Oregon
a.

Legislative History

Oregon was the first state to legalize aid-in-dying with its Death
185
The Act was initially approved by Ballot
with Dignity Act.
186
Measure 16 in the 1994 general election. It was later challenged
in 1997 by Ballot Measure 51, which was referred by the state
187
legislature and which sought to repeal the Act.
This ballot
188
The Act was
measure was defeated by a sixty percent vote.
challenged a second time by the administration of President
George W. Bush, but was ultimately upheld by the United States
189
Supreme Court in 2006.

(decision upholding guardian’s right to remove ward’s artificial feeding tube when
that right was given by court order); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)
(decision granting guardian’s right to terminate artificial life-support system of
adult ward in comatose condition with no reasonable possibility of emergence).
184. See Vacco V. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997) (stating that it would be
constitutional for New York, as a state, to draw a legislative distinction regarding
assisted suicide and the right to withdraw life support). This opinion refused to
recognize a guarantee to physician-assisted suicide under the Constitution’s Equal
Protection clause, but did not hold that physician-assisted suicide was
unconstitutional. Id. at 799–800; SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 40. Rather,
the Court left the decision for the states to approve through ballot measures or
legislation. Id. at 40.
185. See The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.80095 (1999).
186. LORI LONG, OR. LEGISLATIVE POLICY & RESEARCH OFFICE, BASICS ON . . .
BALLOT MEASURE 51, 1 (1997), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm
/commsrvs/51final.pdf (noting that Ballot Measure 16 was approved by a two
percent margin). A day before the Act went into effect, the United States District
Court of Oregon issued a temporary restraining order against the Act and later
issued a permanent injunction. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
This was ultimately reversed on appeal and lifted. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997).
187. LONG, supra note 186, at 1.
188. OR. SECRETARY OF STATE OFFICIAL RESULTS, STATE MEASURE NO. 51, NOV. 4,
1997,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov497/other.info/m51abst.htm
(noting that Measure 51 was defeated 666,275 to 445,830).
189. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (granting State of Oregon an
injunction that prevented the application of the U.S. Attorney General’s
interpretive rule, which indicated that physicians operating under the state Death
with Dignity Act were violating the federal Controlled Substances Act).
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193

Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act

Under the Death with Dignity Act, a patient must be
“qualified” under the statute to request and receive death-with190
dignity. To request assistance under the Act, the patient must be
an adult (18 years or older), “capable” of making and
communicating health care decisions as defined by the statute, a
191
resident of Oregon, and diagnosed as terminal.
The patient’s
wish to die must be made voluntarily and the resulting request for
192
life-ending medication must be written.
Following a fifteen-day
waiting period, the qualified patient must reiterate her wish to die,
193
at which point the attending physician can write the prescription.
Akin to the Benelux laws, the attending physician under the
Oregon statute must satisfy a number of requirements to assist the
patient. First, the physician must verify that the patient is
194
“qualified,” according to the terms stated above.
Second, the
physician must inform the patient of a list of factors that are
195
important in making the decision to request lethal medication.
These factors include the patient’s medical diagnosis and prognosis
and any feasible alternatives to the treatment permitted under the
196
Act.
Third, the physician must refer the patient to a consulting
physician to confirm the diagnosis and determine the patient’s
197
capacity and voluntariness. The physician must also comply with
198
recording requirements set out in the statute.
Physicians under Oregon’s act have requirements that depart
from those of the Benelux nations. The physician is required to
recommend that the patient notify her next of kin and counsel the
patient about the importance of having another person present
199
The patient
when the patient takes the medication prescribed.
190. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(11) (2009).
191. Id. § 127.805(1). Capability is evaluated by the court, the patient’s
attending or consulting physician, or a psychiatrist or psychologist. Id. §
127.800(3).
Residency is determined by the factors in section 127.860.
Terminality is defined in section 127.800(12).
192. Id. § 127.805(1). The written request must be “in substantially the [same]
form” as section 127.897. Id. § 127.810(1).
193. Id. §§ 127.840, .850.
194. Id. § 127.815(1)(a); see supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
195. Id. § 127.815(1)(c)(A)–(E).
196. Id.
197. Id. §§ 127.815(d), .820. The consulting physician’s opinion must be in
writing. Id. § 127.820.
198. Id. §§ 127.815(j), .855, .865.
199. Id. § 127.815(f)–(g); see also id. § 127.835 (“A patient who declines or is
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must also be informed that she has an opportunity to rescind the
request at any time and be offered that opportunity again at the
200
end of the fifteen-day waiting period.
There must also be
verification, immediately prior to writing the prescription, that the
201
patient’s decision is informed.
2.

Washington

Washington was next to follow suit in the United States by
202
approving Ballot Initiative 1000 in the 2008 general election.
203
This ballot initiative was modeled on the Oregon measure, and
204
both statutes have the same provisions. Washington’s Death with
Dignity Act is primarily enforced by the State Department of
Health, which collects the data reported by physicians operating
205
under it.
The Department of Health is also in charge of
206
providing statistical reports annually.
3.

Aftermath

Relatively few people have utilized the Death with Dignity Act
207
in Oregon, but the number is gradually increasing.
unable to notify next of kin shall not have his or her request denied for that
reason.”).
200. Id. § 127.815(h); see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
201. Id. §§ 127.815(i), .830. The statute does not describe the details of this
second verification. Thus, it is unclear as to whether the physician is required to
repeat all of the subjects listed under section 127.815(c), see supra text
accompanying note 196, or whether the physician merely has to confirm that the
patient remembers the initial conversation regarding those factors and
understands the consequences of his actions.
202. Wash. Sec’y of State, November 4, 2008 General Election, http://vote.wa.gov
/Elections/WEI/ResultsByCounty.aspx?ElectionID=26&RaceID=101369&CountyC
ode=%20&JurisdictionTypeID=-2&RaceTypeCode=M&ViewMode=Resul
ts. The initiative passed by a roughly fifty-eight to forty-two percent margin. Id.
Thirty out of thirty-nine counties voted to approve the initiative. Id.; see also Jane
Gross, Landscape Evolves for Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at D8.
203. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
204. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245 (West Supp. 2010) with OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
205. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.150 (West Supp. 2010); see also Wash.
State Dep’t of Health, Center for Health Statistics, http://www.doh.wa.gov/dwda
/default.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
206. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.150(3) (West Supp. 2010).
207. See Jackson Pickett, Can Legalization Improve End-of-Life Care? An Empirical
Analysis of the Results of the Legalization of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in
the Netherlands and Oregon, 16 ELDER L.J. 333, 360 (2009) (discussing the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide and its effect on physicians’ behavior and
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Studies show that 401 people have received prescriptions
208
under the law from enactment through 2008. In Washington, six
prescriptions were dispensed by May of 2009, but there has only
209
been one report of death from drugs prescribed under the Act.
The Washington number can be expected to increase, as there is
little data at this time due to the law’s relatively new enactment.
4.

Montana

A recent decision issued by the Montana Supreme Court
recognized a patient’s right to aid-in-dying by determining that
doctors are immune from prosecution for assisting in a patient’s
210
The case originated in
request to die under Montana state law.
district court, where the plaintiff challenged “the constitutionality
of the application of Montana homicide statutes to physicians who
211
provide aid in dying . . . .”
Plaintiff Robert Baxter won his case
against the state when the Montana District Court issued an
212
opinion in 2008 affirming his right to choose aid-in-dying.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana addressed the
issue of whether the district court erred in its decision that
“competent, terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to die
with dignity, which protects physicians who provide aid in dying
213
from prosecution under the homicide statutes.”
The court
end-of-life care).
208. See Or. Dep’t of Human Servs., Death with Dignity Act Annual Reports,
http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ar-index.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
209. William Yardley, First Death for Washington Assisted-Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2009, at A10; see also US State’s First Assisted Suicide, BBC NEWS (May 22,
2009) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8064559.stm.
210. Kirk Johnson, Montana Ruling Bolsters Doctor-Assisted Suicide, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 1, 2010, at A17, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01suicide.html.
211. Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Mont. 2009). The complaint
specifically lists the state constitutional rights of the terminally ill that are allegedly
violated when a physician is prosecuted for aid-in-dying. Those rights are: the
right of privacy; the right of individual dignity; the right to due process of law; the
right to equal protection of the laws; and the right to seek safety, health, and
happiness in all lawful ways. Complaint at 7, Baxter v. Montana, No. ADV-2007787, (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008), 2008 WL 6627324 available at
http://www.compassionandchoices.org/documents/Baxter%20complaint.pdf.
The complaint states that physicians’ “own fundamental rights of individual
privacy and due process of law” are violated as well. Id.
212. See Baxter, 2008 WL 6627324. The plaintiffs include Mr. Baxter, four
physicians, and Compassion & Choices. Id.
213. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1213–14. Mr. Baxter passed away as a result of
lymphocytic leukemia just hours after the district court judge issued her decision.
Compassion
&
Choices,
Montana
Death
With
Dignity,
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declined to rule on the constitutional claims, stating that “this
Court is guided by the judicial principle that we should decline to
rule on the constitutionality of a legislative act if we are able to
214
decide the case without reaching constitutional questions.”
However, the court did analyze the Montana Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act, which “confers on terminally ill patients a right
to have their end-of-life wishes followed, even if it requires direct
participation by a physician through withdrawing or withholding
215
treatment.” The court ultimately found that “[t]he Terminally Ill
Act explicitly shields physicians from criminal, civil, or professional
liability for the act of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining
216
treatment from a terminally ill patient who requests it.”
The
court additionally noted that “failure to give effect to a terminally
ill patient’s life-ending declaration is a crime” under the Terminally
217
Ill Act.
Overall, the court found that aid-in-dying is not against public
policy, according to Montana Supreme Court precedent and
218
Montana statutes.
The court found that public policy is not
violated when a physician assists in a patient’s death because it is
“the patient—not the physician—[who] commits the final death219
causing act by self-administering a lethal dose of medicine.”
Montana is facing a situation in which its supreme court has
authorized terminally ill patients’ access to aid-in-dying by holding
that physicians are not criminally or civilly liable for complying with
a competent, terminally ill patient’s request for lethal medication
220
Nevertheless, the court did not
under current state law.
approach the subject of whether aid-in-dying is a constitutional
221
right under the Montana Constitution. By restricting its holding
to the judicial realm, the court has chosen to leave the future of the
state’s aid-in-dying laws up to the legislative process.

http://www.compassionandchoices.org/montana (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
214. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1214.
215. Id. at 1218 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103 (2009)).
216. Id. at 1219 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-204 (2009)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1222.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1219.
221. Id. at 224 P.3d 1211. If the court had ruled aid-in-dying to be a
constitutional right, it would have been the first to do so in the nation. See
Johnson, supra note 210.
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Connecticut

On June 1, 2010, Judge Julia L. Aurigemma of the Connecticut
Superior Court granted a motion to dismiss an action brought by
two Connecticut physicians who were seeking declaratory and
222
injunctive relief to allow them to perform aid-in-dying.
The
physicians were specifically seeking protection from prosecution
under a Connecticut statute that criminalizes the act of
223
intentionally causing or aiding another person to commit suicide.
The plaintiff-physicians had experience treating “terminally-ill,
mentally-competent patients who have requested, or discussed the
possibility of, aid in dying,” and were seeking to legally assist those
patients because, in their professional judgment, “aid in dying
would be a medically and ethically appropriate option for those
224
patients who request it.”
The court found that the case was
barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine and that it was a non225
As in Montana, the Connecticut court
justiciable claim.
determined that the legality of aid-in-dying is best left to the
226
legislature and not the court.
E.

Switzerland

Switzerland is an outlier among the countries where aid-indying has been legalized. Officially, there is no statute explicitly
legalizing any form of aid-in-dying, but Switzerland is important to
this issue because it has permitted both physician-assisted suicide
227
Instead of explicit legalization,
and assisted suicide since 1937.
the limitations of assisted suicide are described in the country’s
228
Penal Code.
222. Memorandum in Support of Def’s. Motion to Dismiss, Blick v. Office of
Div. of Criminal Justice, No. CV-09-5033392, 2010 WL 2817256, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 2, 2010), available at http://www.compassionandchoices.org//
documents/BlickVCTMemoSupportOfMotionToDismiss.11192009.pdf.
223. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53(a)-56 (2009)).
224. Blick, 2010 WL 2817256, at *1. The opinion describes certain terminal
patients, like those treated by the plaintiffs, as facing the limited choices of
“prolonged and unrelieved anguish on the one hand, or unconsciousness [due to
terminal sedation] and total loss of control and personal dignity on the other.”
Id.
225. Id. at *15.
226. Id.
227. SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 69.
228. See Assisted Suicide, Fed. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs, http://www.eda.admin
.ch/eda/en/home/reps/eur/vgbr/ukemlo/legaff/uklaas.html (last visited Oct.
29, 2010).
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Article 115 of the Swiss Penal Code states that assisted suicide
is not a criminal offense if “there is no personal motive for or gain
229
through the assistance.” Article 114 of the Penal Code prohibits
230
killing on request.
1. Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences Guidelines
The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences has formulated its own
231
guidelines for physicians based on the Penal Code.
These
guidelines rely on Article 16 of the Penal Code to define a patient
232
with the ability to make decisions.
Article 16 requires that the
patient be able to “understand information regarding the decision”
he is making, be capable of evaluating the situation and the
consequences of possible alternatives, and be able to “express his
233
own choice.”
These requirements encompass the core values of
competence and voluntary choice that all of the countries discussed
234
thus far have incorporated in their legislation.
The guidelines
also state that a physician’s assistance in a patient’s wish to commit
suicide is allowed when the patient is “in the final phase of life,
235
when the situation becomes intolerable for the patient.”
Physicians are given a checklist of conditions that must be
236
present before they can assist a patient in dying.
The patient’s
condition must be terminal and alternative possibilities must be
237
discussed. The patient must be competent to make the decision,
must have put sufficient thought into the decision, must be making
238
the decision voluntarily, and must repeat his wish to end his life.
All of these conditions must be reviewed by a third person, who is
229. SCHERER & SIMON, supra note 127, at 70 (elaborating that an assisted
suicide must be performed solely for humane reasons, without personal gain); see
also CARE OF PATIENTS IN THE END OF LIFE: MEDICAL-ETHICAL GUIDELINES OF THE SAMS, SWISS
ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, 1, 6 (2004) [hereinafter SWISS ACADEMY], available at
http://www.samw.ch/dms/en/Ethics/Guidelines/Currently-valid-guidelines
/e_RL_Lebens
ende.pdf.
230. SWISS ACADEMY, supra note 229 at 6.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 7.
233. Id.
234. See note 143 (Netherlands); notes 162, 164 (Belgium); notes 181–82
(Luxembourg); notes 193–96 (Oregon); note 207 (Washington) and
accompanying text.
235. SWISS ACADEMY, supra note 229, at 6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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239

not required to be a doctor. Finally, the patient must act on his
240
This means that a physician is not able to
own to end his life.
administer drugs through a syringe or an I.V., but must give
241
medication to the patient to take on his own.
2. Suicide Tourism and Suicide Clinics
Lay people are permitted to practice aid-in-dying in
242
Switzerland. It is also the only country that permits non-residents
243
to seek euthanasia within its jurisdiction.
Switzerland is
distinguished by its so-called “suicide clinics,” which accept patients
244
This leads to the issue of “suicide
from all over the world.
tourism,” which has recently been of great concern to some
245
lawmakers.
EXIT Switzerland is a major group organizing aid-in-dying
246
through Swiss clinics.
The organization requires a patient to be
247
competent, terminally ill, and over the age of 18. Once a patient
248
applies to a clinic, she is evaluated by an EXIT physician. When
there is doubt, a team consisting of a lawyer, a psychiatrist, and a
249
second physician evaluate the patient. The process of assisting in
the patient’s death requires that a member of the EXIT team and a
250
witness remain with the patient throughout the procedure. The
team first administers relaxants and then barbiturates to the patient
251
until she passes away.

239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. Assisted Suicide in the World, supra note 140.
243. Id.
244. Swiss Plan Controls on ‘Suicide Tourism,’ CNN WORLD (Oct. 29, 2009, 11:45
AM), [hereinafter Swiss Plan], http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/10
/29/assisted.suicide.switzerland/index.htm.
245. Id. (reporting that the Swiss Federal Council is proposing legislation that
would limit the practice of assisted suicide or ban it altogether due to the
borderline law-infringing actions taken by groups that run suicide clinics).
246. The Swiss Model, EXIT INTERNATIONAL, http://www.exitinternational.net
/page/Switzerland (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
247. ELAINE FOX, JEFFREY J. KAMAKAHI & STELLA M. CAPEK, COME LOVELY AND
SOOTHING DEATH: THE RIGHT TO DIE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (Twayne
Publishers 1999).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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3. The Future of the Swiss Predicament
The absence of a specific law regulating aid-in-dying in
252
Switzerland has created a significant amount of controversy.
A
lack of strict reporting requirements puts into question the
253
competency of those receiving assistance.
Also, the seemingly
wide-open doors of suicide clinics have led to high publicity and
254
questionable practices.
A recent article reported that the Swiss Parliament is currently
considering two proposals from the Federal Council to remedy the
255
regulatory deficiency. The first proposal aims to “ensure that the
person committing suicide is doing it of [his] own free will, and
256
that the person assisting [him] is not driven by personal gain.”
It would limit the availability of assisted suicide to patients with
a terminal illness (whereas the current situation allows assistance
257
“for those suffering from a chronic or mental illness”). Many of
the other requirements of the first proposal are similar to what is in
258
place in existing legislation in other parts of the world.
The
Council prefers the first proposal being considered by Parliament
over the second, as the second option would completely ban
259
organized assisted suicide.
Overall, both options seek to restrict
260
“organized” assisted suicide, not assisted suicide altogether.

252. See Swiss Plan, supra note 244.
253. See id. (stating that if either legislative proposal is adopted “people . . .
who have a mental illness could no longer legally take advantage of assisted
suicide.”).
254. Reports from 1997 estimated that there were about 100–120 patients
dying at the clinics each year. See FOX ET AL., supra note 247. Recent reports state,
“At least 117 Britons have traveled abroad for an assisted suicide since 2002, at an
average of two a month . . . .” Swiss Plan, supra note 244.
255. See Swiss Plan, supra note 244.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., id. Provisions of the prospective plan that are similar to alreadyexisting laws include requirements that the patient give “‘proper consideration’”
of options before proceeding; that the patient provide certificates from two
doctors affirming mental capacity and diagnosing the patient with a terminal
illness; and that “[t]hose assisting with suicide” discuss alternatives to suicide with
patients. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Swiss Plan, supra note 244.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A.

Cultural Climate

Perhaps the temporal distance that society now has from the
practices of eugenics and genocide associated with the Nazi
atrocities of World War II has opened a pathway for today’s society
to accept euthanasia as a legitimate legal option. People may now
be able to separate a system that allows for voluntary assisted
suicide from government-mandated eugenics. There is evidence
that modern society can tolerate limited and workable passive and
voluntary euthanasia (such as the right to refuse treatment and aid261
in-dying).
Permitting euthanasia with such a limited scope can
detract from fears of sliding down a “slippery slope” into the realm
of involuntary euthanasia. As is demonstrated in some of the
regulatory systems explored in this article, a carefully crafted law
262
can accomplish this goal.
B.

Should Aid-in-Dying be Regulated by Law?

Regulation via laws that permit some limited forms of aid-indying seems to be the better option when considering the situation
that the United Kingdom is currently facing. There, prosecutors
tend to look the other way in many cases where it appears that
euthanasia was voluntary, yet the Director of Public Prosecutions
263
cannot assure anyone that he will not be prosecuted. Instead of
drawing a line to designate what is legally permissible and what is
264
impermissible, the country leaves its citizens in the dark.
The
terminally ill who want the option of aid-in-dying not only have to
suffer through the pain and anguish of their disease, but also the
anxiety of wondering whether their loved ones will be prosecuted
265
for helping to end their suffering at their direction.
For physician assisted aid-in-dying, it is argued that legalization
allows physicians to practice publicly, thus encouraging an open

261. See supra Part III (discussing the legalization of assisted suicide).
262. See, e.g., SWISS ACADEMY, supra note 229, at 6 (discussing competency and
voluntariness).
263. See Nick Triggle, Assisted Suicide Law ‘Clarified,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2009,
10:22 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8270320.stm.
264. See id. (noting that there are factors to guide decisions but “‘no
guarantees against prosecution.’”).
265. See id.
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266

exchange of information with colleagues and patients. Laws also
create accountability in people’s actions and provide checks to
267
ensure that practices are performed within the legal parameters.
If there is an opportunity to clarify the nature of the law and how it
268
operates, that opportunity should be taken.
C.

Well-Functioning Components of Current Aid-in-Dying Laws

Throughout the regulatory provisions established to limit the
269
scope of euthanasia practices, several recurring themes can be
identified. First, all of the laws insist that the aid-in-dying be
270
voluntary. Second, they mandate that the person receiving aid-indying be mentally competent to make a decision to die and that the
271
Finally, these laws express a preference
decision be informed.
that a second opinion be sought from an independent medical
272
professional.
273
Among the Benelux countries, Belgium’s statute seems to
provide the most specific guidelines without being overly complex
274
or restrictive. It allows patients to have greater options at end-oflife stages, but has stronger measures in place to ensure that a
patient is competent, fully informed, and making a voluntary
266. See Charles Baron et al., Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8–9 (1996) (stating that the legal
prohibition of aid-in-dying forces physicians to “be compelled by fear of
prosecution to [provide assistance in suicide] in secret, without the opportunity to
discuss the case fully and freely with colleagues or other professionals.” Whereas,
when aid-in-dying is legalized, “physicians have access to a variety of professional
consultations, often including review by ethics committees or consultants, in
connection with other profoundly serious medical-ethical decisions.”).
267. Id. at 9 (noting that accountability helps to ensure that a patient is
competent and fully informed).
268. In Switzerland, where aid-in-dying is openly practiced and the limitations
are few, ambiguity also reigns. The state prosecutor in Zurich even argues for
legalization, stating that “‘there should be tighter controls, regulating the quality
of the help offered . . . [a]nd more transparency when it comes to individual cases,
to finances and to the organisation itself.’” Roger Boyes, Murky Truth Behind Swiss
Suicide ‘Clinic’ Dignitas, TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.timesonline.co
.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article5006805.ece. Whether liberally accepted or
strictly prohibited, people are calling for definition to be put to this prevalent
practice. See TRIGGLE, supra note 263.
269. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1, III.C, III.D.1.B, III.D.2, III.E.1.
270. Id.; see, e.g., Assisted Suicide in the World, supra note 140.
271. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1, III.C, III.D.1.B, III.D.2, III.E.1.
272. Id.
273. See Belgian Act, supra note 153.
274. Id.; supra notes 155–76 and accompanying text.
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275

decision.
Belgium’s statute covers more ground than other
legislation in that it prescribes different measures for different endof-life scenarios and specifies the requisite condition of the
276
patient.
It also insists on greater competency of the patient by
277
limiting aid-in-dying to adults. The likelihood that a patient will
be making a voluntary and informed decision is also strengthened
by the requirements that there be repeated requests by the patient
to the doctor, that several consultations between the doctor and
patient take place, and that the physician inform the patient of her
278
condition and all of the alternatives available.
One of the foregoing requirements—that a terminally ill
patient have “several” conversations with her physician—is
vulnerable to abuse: Doctors who oppose aid-in-dying might insist
on having a more than sufficient number of conversations, and,
thus, indirectly impose a waiting period on patients who do not
279
have much time left. Although this abuse may not be frequent, it
would be better to clear up the vague interpretation surrounding
the word “reasonable” by suggesting an appropriate end to the
conversations. This could be measured in time or content, as some
statutes already require specific temporal waiting periods and
others provide a list of topics to be covered prior to assisting in a
280
death.
281
282
The Oregon and Washington Acts also have admirable
275. Id.; supra notes 160–65.
276. See supra notes 163, 171–73 (The Act distinguishes between a patient that
is terminal, one who is terminal but death is not imminent, and a patient who is
unconscious.).
277. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
279. Physicians and hospitals are allowed to refuse to provide aid-in-dying.
Although doctors are not required by any statute to assist patients in their decision
to die, there is a possibility that a physician could act upon his moral beliefs by
postponing the process to limit the patient’s ability to continue to seek aid-indying. I surmise that this circumstance is not highly likely because physicians are
subject to strict professional guidelines and would be more apt to simply refer the
patient elsewhere if they choose to opt out of acting under the permissive legal
provisions for aid-in-dying. Whether or not physicians are willing to refer their
patients elsewhere, some physicians practicing in jurisdictions that permit aid-indying have chosen not to participate in a patient’s decision to exercise her rights
under the law. See PHYSICIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE EDUCATION FOUNDATION
HOME PAGE, http://www.pccef.org/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) (an
organization of physicians founded as a response to the passing of Oregon’s Death
With Dignity Act that outwardly opposes “doctor assisted suicide”).
280. See, e.g., supra notes 169, 194 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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safeguards. The residency requirement (included in all countries
283
except Switzerland) eliminates the problems that arise from
284
“suicide tourism.”
The requirement that requests be written
increases the assurance of competency and the intent of the
patient. The laundry list of subjects that physicians are required to
review with their patients further ensures an informed patient. A
referral to a second doctor helps to reinforce the attending
physician’s judgment regarding the appropriateness of the
assistance. The written opinion of the consulting physician
provides a second source of records for future evaluation. Doctors
are appropriately designated as the select group that may assist in a
patient’s request because they have the expertise to ensure that the
285
process goes smoothly and painlessly.
Evidence provided in studies that attempt to evaluate aid-indying legalization does not provide a clear depiction of whether
one law is performing more successfully than another. One factor
that makes the comparison difficult is the cultural variations
286
between each country. While some studies report that euthanasia
(including legalized physician-assisted suicide and non-voluntary
euthanasia) has increased in Belgium since Parliament passed its
statute, other reports indicate that the Netherlands has
experienced a decrease in aid-in-dying, and that it is seldom
287
Another statistical problem is the lack of
exercised in Oregon.
data acquired prior to each law’s enactment, which limits the
opportunity for a comprehensive before-and-after examination.
Finally, there is not enough data compiled from recently enacted
288
laws to permit much analysis on how they are performing.
282. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
285. “Determining the correct drug(s) to effect a humane death, and the
amount and manner of consumption, is a complex medical pharmacological task.”
Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a
Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 495, 497 n.11 (1995).
286. See Penney Lewis, The Empirical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non-Voluntary
Euthanasia, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 205 (2007) (commenting that “cultural
factors may significantly influence baseline rates [in statistical studies], thus
further decreasing the possibility of drawing inferences from evidence in one
jurisdiction as to what will happen in another”).
287. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.3, III.D.1.b.
288. Naturally, more data is available for the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Oregon, since their laws have existed for a longer period of time. Washington and
Luxembourg do not have much data, as their acts were enacted in 2008, and
Switzerland does not provide much opportunity for statistical comparison due to
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There is still much to learn about how these new laws are
operating in their respective cultures. Nevertheless, it appears that
289
certain statutory provisions are worth maintaining.
These legal
safeguards are linked to important core values that can be found
290
running throughout the recently enacted aid-in-dying laws.
Those values include the legal competence of patients to seek aidin-dying and the voluntary and informed nature of their decision to
291
die.
A majority of the laws restrict the practice of assisting in
death to a medical professional who has the expertise to ensure
292
that the process goes smoothly.
This factor, along with review
processes that are in place, guard against abuses that might
otherwise be inflicted upon the class of persons whom the laws are
designed to serve. Each of the five regulatory systems studied in
this paper has a strong foundation. Only time can tell whether they
will stand as they are or evolve into something new.

its unique circumstances.
289. See, e.g., supra notes 274–78 and accompanying text; see also supra notes,
283–85 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 275, 281–85 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 144, 162, 164, 179, 192–97, 204, 238 and accompanying
text.
292. See, e.g., supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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